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ABSTRACT
Illicit drugs can travel across multiple borders before reaching their
intended retail market. International drug trafficking is important because it
introduces a large quantity of foreign sourced illicit drugs into domestic drug
markets. Of utmost importance are countries that lie along the transshipment
paths used by international drug trafficking operations that facilitate the
movement of illicit drugs. Understanding the characteristics of countries
operating as transit states is necessary to combat transshipment operations. The
study investigates social, economic, geographic, and political factors that have
the potential to account for nations being positioned as transit states in illicit drug
transshipment networks generated from the United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime Individual Drug Seizures data set. Quadratic assignment procedure (QAP)
regression models reveal that border connectivity is the most significant
identifying marker of transit states embedded in international drug trafficking.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
International drug trafficking is a type of transnational organized crime in
which groups and individuals operate to facilitate the global movement of illicit
drugs. More formally, the United States National Security Council (2011) defines
transnational organized crime as involving groups or individuals who—operate
across national borders, are driven by monetary gain, conduct their activities
often by illegal means, seek to influence institutional structures in which they
operate, and exploit differences between countries to do their bidding. The
profitability associated with international drug trafficking continues to draw
individuals, making it the second most lucrative illicit market (Global Financial
Integrity, 2017).
Global Financial Integrity estimates in their Transnational Crime and the
Developing World (2017) report that the illicit drug market is worth between $426
billion to $652 billion US dollars. The demand for product drives the market,
securing future profits as buyers and users become dependent. Since 2009,
there has been a 30% increase in consumption rates of illicit drugs worldwide
(World Drug Report, 2019). According to the United Nations World Drug Report
(2019), an estimated 271 million individuals worldwide used some form of illicit
drug in 2017. The consequences of illicit drug use are significant. For instance,
more than half a million individuals between the ages of 15 to 64 died in 2017
from illicit drug use (World Drug Report, 2017).
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International drug trafficking operations are structurally different from
domestic operations in terms of functionality and operation (Reuter, 2014;
Swanstorm, 2007). While the transshipment of illicit drugs is a considerably small
component of the illicit drug market commodity-chain as a whole, it is a critical
link in understanding the flow of illicit drugs (Malm & Bichler, 2011). Specifically,
it is important to observe the role of countries (international level actors)
embedded across transshipment operations as they facilitate the movement of
illicit drugs. In this study, countries involved in the transshipment of illicit drugs
will be referred to as transit states.
A transit state is operationalized as a country that enables the movement
of illicit drugs across national and international borders (knowingly or not).
Designated transit states act as a bridge between any two given countries,
influencing the flow of illicit drugs. Understanding the markers associated with
countries operating as transit states will enable researchers and practitioners to
predict and identify areas of weakness along transshipment operations, and
supports the development of proactive policies.

Outline
This thesis includes four additional chapters. Chapter two reviews the
academic literature concerning the transshipment of illicit drugs. Then, transit
states are described, and their importance highlighted. The theoretical
frameworks applied to the study of transshipment operations are also reviewed.
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Next, the role transit states play in facilitating the movement of illicit drugs is
explained. Lastly, the characteristics of transit states are debated.
Chapter three explains the methodology. The chapter begins by providing
a brief overview of the research design. Network generation is then described, as
is the primary data source for the study. Next, I discuss attribute variables and
explain how the dependent variable was classed using three network centrality
measures. The chapter ends by discussing the analytic plan.
Chapter four describes the results obtained during the analyses. First,
network descriptors are provided for networks generated, and then, countries
designated as transit states are identified. Lastly, I present findings from
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) regression models.
Chapter five discusses the study’s main findings in relation to the
hypotheses made at the beginning of the study. Then, potential policy
implications are presented and discussed briefly. Next, I present limitations
relating to the scope of the study as a whole. The chapter ends with a discussion
of avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Transshipment of Illicit Drugs
The most recent global estimates show that roughly 271 million people
reported having used some type of illicit drug in a single year (World Drug
Report, 2019). Of that, 11 million individuals reported having injected illicit drugs,
from which 1.4 million reported having HIV, 5.6 million reported having Hepatitis
C, and 1.2 million reported having both (World Drug Report, 2019). While
medical costs associated with drug use and collateral disease transmission are
significant, these estimates underrepresent the scope of the problem—of those
who suffer from drug-related disorders, only about one in seven are able to
receive treatment (World Drug Report, 2019). Moreover, the detrimental cost
associated with the production, transshipment, and distribution of illicit drugs
goes beyond financial burdens (Enderwick, 2016). Drug markets pose significant
social and health issues at both the individual and community level, aggravating
problems already affecting the nations involved (Trumbore & Woo, 2014;
Enderwick, 2016; Bybee, 2012; Swanstorm, 2007).
Moving illicit products along the international drug market commoditychain requires different activities (Malm & Bichler, 2011). To understand how
product flows into retail markets, it is necessary to investigate what factors
contribute to the success of transshipment operations. The transshipment of illicit
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drugs is the process in which illicit drugs ship to an intermediary destination,
before reaching their final destination. The intermediary destinations used for the
transshipment of illicit drugs are referred to as transit states.

Transit States – What are They?
Transit states positioned within a network of international drug trafficking
routes are key points that enable the transshipment of illicit drugs to cross
borders and move between nations (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Trumbore & Woo,
2014). Without the fluidity of international movement, the perceived risk-to-benefit
ratios associated with smuggling operations would decline significantly
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe,
2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011).
Porous borders improve risk-to-benefit ratios by limiting exposure to legal
barriers and maximizing profitability. When porous border controls interact with
weak political and security systems, illicit drug problems can contribute to
increased regional and global scale security threats (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012;
Sands, 2007; Swanstorm, 2007). Studies find that transit states are likely to
suffer from institutional fragmentation and instability (Bybee, 2012, Maftei, 2012;
Miraglia et al., 2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011; Sands, 2007; Emmers, 2003). Since
involvement in the transshipment of illicit drugs is not always voluntary—at times
couriers are coerced to participate (Caulkins, 2009; Sands, 2007)—drug related
activities could exacerbate public safety concerns already prevalent in unstable
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social systems. Studies also show potential links between illicit drug
transshipment operations and terrorist groups established in transit states, further
raising security threats in and around that region (Ekici & Coban, 2014; Wyler &
Cook, 2011).

Theoretical Frameworks
It is important to note that there is no established theoretical framework to
explain international drug trafficking fully. Combining two perspectives—the small
world perspective and the price risk model—it is possible to develop an
integrated explanation for the structural position of states within the network of
transnational illicit drug distribution.
Small Worlds Perspective
The small world perspective stems from a set of experiments conducted
by Milgram (1967), in which he observed how likely it was that two random
individuals from the same community of actors could be connected to one
another. Focusing on societal network structures, Milgram (1967) notes how two
individuals can be connected back to each other indirectly via six acquaintances
at most. The Milgram (1967) study emphasizes the role of intermediaries in
observed networks, identifying the critical function played by hubs and bridges in
generating structural features that foster social integration.
In the small world perspective, hubs are actors with many direct ties, and
often these highly connected individual’s link to other hubs. Bridges are central
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actors, whose positioning connects other actors that otherwise would not be
connected. As societal networks evolve, a process of self-organization occurs
wherein structures continue to develop, i.e., over time highly central actors, such
as hubs, will link to other hubs. Relating the small world perspective to this study,
a transit state is an actor that is central to the transshipment of illicit drugs. In
applying the logic behind the small world’s perspective to this study, countries
are only designated transit states if they are central to the network they are in.
The central positioning of actors is theoretically linked to centrality metrics.
Prior research that incorporated the use of network analyses has used numerous
centrality metrics to identify key individuals, countries, paths, and factors believed
to facilitate the movements of illicit drugs (Berlusconi, Aziani, & Giommoni, 2017;
Giommoni, Aziani, & Berlusconi, 2017; Boivin, 2014). The incorporation of more
than one centrality metric allows for the robust identification of critical actors in
any given network.
Drawing upon network science provides investigative techniques that can
be applied to relationships observed between individuals and organizations, even
physical spaces. Concerned with the interrelatedness of social units and how
they influence one another, this discipline offers metrics to observe individual
actors in relation to others, and the overall operating structure (Wasserman &
Faust, 1994). Here, social actors are countries, and intended drug shipments
constitute the ties connecting nations. If centrality metrics can be used to identify
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critical actors in any given network, then these metrics could be used to identify
transit states critical to international drug trafficking networks.
Prices and Risk Model
In 1989, Reuter and Kleiman proposed a risk and price model to analyze
international drug trafficking. The model assumes that individuals involved in the
illicit transnational drug trade are rational actors who intentionally select a transit
states (Giommoni, Aziani, & Berlusconi, 2017; Boivin, 2014; Reuter, 2014).
Reuter and Klein (1989) argue that choice structuring factors relating to risk and
price lead illicit drug operations to channel shipments through countries where
risk of seizure is low, resulting in higher profits. According to this model, illicit
drug transshipment operations are driven by factors that mediate risk and
increase profit for those involved (Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). It follows, that efforts
to combat international drug trafficking require identification of transit states using
characteristics that represent price maximization and risk minimization (Boivin,
2014; Reuter & Kleiman, 1989).

Characteristics of Transit States
Academic literature acknowledges that transit states embedded in illicit
drug transshipment operations possess similar characteristics (Berlusconi et al.,
2017; Boivin, 2013; Bybee, 2012; Maftei, 2012; Miraglia et al., 2012; Toktas &
Selimoglu, 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; Sands, 2007; Morselli & Giguere, 2006). Four
types of factors are believed to facilitate the use of a country as a transit state for
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transshipment operations: social, economic, geographic, and political factors
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Boivin, 2013, 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Bybee,
2012; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011; Ellis, 2009; Sands, 2007).
Social Factors
Social factors observed to influence transshipment operations relate to
how close one country is to another based on socially construed ties, a concept
known as social proximity (Giommoni et al., 2017). Social proximity is crucial as it
facilitates the use of a country as a transit state in transshipment by creating
relational ties between individuals located in drug-producing countries and
potential transit states. Academic literature notes that countries with higher levels
of social proximity to drug producing countries are more likely to be used as
transit states (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et al., 2017; Trumbore & Woo,
2014; Bybee, 2012; Miraglia et al., 2012; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012). In addition
to influencing the direction of drug flow across transshipment operations, social
proximity influences the frequency at which illicit drugs are trafficked (Berlusconi
et al., 2017).
Several indicators may be indicative of social proximity and can be used to
observe the social proximity between any two countries; such as migration
patterns, the presence of ethnic enclaves, and even rates at which a non-native
language is spoken (Leuprecht et al., 2016; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle,
2011). Social proximity facilitates the use of a country as a transit state across
transshipment operations as it enables individuals to connect with others whom
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they share some sort of tie stemming from socio-cultural construed relationships
(Leuprecht et al., 2016; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 2011, Caulkins, 2009;
Heber, 2009; Morselli & Giguere, 2006).
The likelihood of a country to be a transit state increases with
corresponding increases in migrant populations. Heavy migration flow from a
drug-producing country to a non-drug-producing country serves as a predictor for
whether that country becomes a transit state (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni
et al., 2017; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sands, 2007). Examples in which heavy
migrant flow and relating factors was seen to facilitate the transshipment of illicit
drugs is observed in countries like Tajikistan, El Salvador, Kenya, Turkey, and
Spain (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Ekici & Coban, 2014; Giommoni et al., 2017;
Miraglia et al., 2012; Sands, 2007).
Spain, for example, attracts migrants from Latin America, as the native
language in both is similar. This, in turn, has facilitated that Spain be used as a
transit state across transshipment operations originating primarily in Columbia,
with the goal of the product making its way to other European countries (Sands,
2007). A study conducted by Ekici and Coban (2014) on the Afghan to Turkey
heroin trade also found that dual citizenship, in particular, makes individuals
more likely to be targeted for couriers across transshipment operations, as they
will face fewer barriers to entry (Giommoni et al., 2017).
Research shows that the greater the size of a migrant population or ethnic
enclave residing in a non-drug-producing country from a drug-producing country,
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the more likely that country is used as a transit state (Heber, 2009; Sands, 2007).
Shared ethnic or cultural ties allow individuals heading transshipment operations
to secure passage for their illicit product, willingly or not, due to social ties
(Heber, 2009; Sands, 2007; Enderwick, 2006; Morselli & Giguere, 2006). Migrant
communities are often not trusting of legal institutions, leaving individuals
vulnerable to coercion by drug traffickers, who force individuals to participate in
drug trafficking operations (Sands, 2007).
Economic Conditions
Economic conditions observed to influence transshipment operations
relate to economic development and profit maximization for those involved in the
illicit activity (Berlusconi et al., 2017). Countries that lack robust economies,
meaning they are economically unstable and little is done by institutional factors
to better it, are more likely to serve as transit states (Bybee, 2012; Maftei, 2012;
Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Sands, 2007). Countries with unstable economies are
observed to emerge and remain as transit states across transshipment
operations; this has been the case with Turkey as well as the Central Asia region
(Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Emmers, 2003). Countries suffering from economic
instability often have high poverty; being that the legal economy is limited,
individuals often turn to alternative avenues like drug trafficking (Bybee, 2012;
Miraglia et al., 2012). Similar observations have occurred across the region of
Africa, where many national economies are characterized as being rather weak,
poor, and oppressed (Bybee, 2012; Ellis, 2009).
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In countries characterized as economically unstable, drug trafficking is
viewed as a means to provide for oneself and their family (Ellis, 2009). Similarly,
countries like Turkey and those in Africa still operate as transit states since
institutional structures allow drug traffickers to reap higher profit. Due to risk
minimization in these regions being inexpensive, those who head the
transshipment operations are able to sell at a higher wholesale rate (Toktas &
Selimoglu, 2012; Bybee, 2012; Ellis, 2009). Profit maximization at the wholesale
level is indicative of a reduced cost of risk in a given country and fewer structural
barriers (Boivin, 2014). Countries that operate as transit states minimize costs
faced by traffickers relating to risk; therefore they tend to have lower drug price
mark-up values (Giommoni et al., 2017).
Geographic Proximity
Geographic proximity, meaning how close one country is to another based
on geographic features, has been observed to facilitate the use of a country as a
transit state (Giommoni, Aziani, Berlusconi, 2017). Geographic proximity—
geographic distance between nations, border connectivity, the size of a
region/country, and geographic positional importance—creates relational ties
between drug-producing countries and those geographically close to them,
because of who that country is connected to (Giommoni et al., 2017; Sands,
2007).
The most basic measurement of geographic proximity is geographic
distance, such as the Euclidian distance between central points within two
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countries. Distance can be measured between a drug-producing country and a
transit state, or between a transit state and a retailing country (Maftei, 2013;
Sabatelle, 2011). Border connectivity relates to the number of borders a given
country shares with other countries, increasing geographic proximity as it has
more options for connectivity (Boivin, 2014; Maftei, 2012). The size of a region
can also relate to geographic proximity as it enables drug trafficking operations to
reach their intended destination without having to cross more than one
international border (Maftei, 2012). Positional importance relates to how
geographically close a country is to a traditional trafficking route or important
region entryway (Maftei, 2012). Traditional trafficking routes like the Balkan
Route and the Northern Route are able to provide a blanket of security for
international drug trafficking operations due to their territorial features (De
Danieli, 2014; Sabatelle, 2011). Therefore, countries that are geographically
close to them become targets to operate as transit states to gain point of entry
(Sabatelle, 2011).
Research observes countries like Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and Iran to
operate as transit states across transshipment operations because they serve as
entry points for other European countries with higher barriers to entry (Ekici &
Coban, 2013; Calderoni, 2012; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Layne, Khruppa, &
Muzyka, 2011). The region of Africa often serves as a transit state for illicit drugs
traveling from South America with the intent of making it to various European
countries and North America (Wyler & Cook, 2011). The country of Tajikistan is
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often used as a transit state for its geographic proximity to what is known as the
Northern Route (Reuter, 2014; Miraglia, Ochoa, Briscoe, 2012). Located right in
the middle of the established trafficking route, the country of Tajikistan operates
as a known transit state for the transshipment of heroin from Central Asia due to
its geographic proximity to the drug-producing region (Reuter, 2014; Miraglia,
Ochoa, Briscoe, 2012).
Across the literature, findings are not conclusive when assessing the
importance of geographic proximity. Some researchers (Berlusconi et al., 2017;
Giommoni et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Wyler &
Cook, 2011) agree that geographic proximity is important in whether a country is
used as transit state, while others argue that geographic proximity can easily be
overlooked and therefore its’ influence is minimal given advances in transnational
logistics (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Ekici & Ozbay, 2013). Geographic proximity
appears to play less of role when risk is too high, and social proximity is rather
low (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013; Sands, 2007). The availability of non-land modes of
transportation like international flights reduces the importance of geographic
proximity as well (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013). Nonetheless, literature does support the
influence of geographic proximity, simply by varying degrees across observed
drug trafficking operations.
Political Factors
Political factors observed to influence transshipment operations relate to
the inability of a country to maintain order or to uphold the law within its borders,
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a concept known as weak governance (Bybee, 2012). A country characterized by
weak governance lacks the institutional and structural powers to combat illicit
activity, like the transshipment of illicit drugs (Sands, 2007). Additionally,
countries characterized by weak governance functioning as transit states tend to
view the transshipment of illicit drugs more favorably (Ellis, 2009).
A country characterized as having weak governance is likely to have
inefficient forms of law enforcement, or perceived as corrupt (Toktas &
Selimoglu, 2012; Ellis, 2009; Sands, 2007). Turkey for example, lacks efficient
border controls, as a result, often used as a transit state due to the limited
capabilities of the institutional system itself (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012). Literature
supports that countries with weak governance are more likely to become transit
states; however, the relationship is nonlinear (Giommoni et al., 2017). Meaning
that weak governance within a transit state is preferred; however, countries
characterized as having extremely weak governances are not ideal (Layne et al.,
2001). Countries in which drug traffickers feel they have a stronger hold than the
country itself are more likely to become a transit state, as lower levels of risk are
perceived (Trumbore & woo, 2014). The longer that a country allows itself to
operate as a transit state, the more embedded it becomes across transshipment
operations (Ellis, 2009).
Corruption plays into risk minimization as it ensures that the illicit goods
will make it across national borders for profit (Leuprecht et al., 2014). Across the
literature, every country that has been observed as a transit state within
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international drug trafficking operations is to some degree perceived as corrupt
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2016; Boivin, 2014; De Danieli, 2014;
Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; Wyler & Cook,
2011; Emmers, 2003; Layne et al., 2001; Sands, 2007; Swanstorm, 2007).
Literature acknowledges that countries with higher levels of perceived corruption
are more likely to become transit states, as drug-producing countries are better
able to minimize risk within their borders. (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et
al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Bybee, 2012; Wyler &
Cook, 2011).
Trumbore and Woo (2014) identified that worldwide, politically stable
countries where corruption can take place are more likely to become transit
states. Spain is a clear example where the country is politically stable, yet
corruption is present and thus used as a transit state (Calderoni, 2012; Sands,
2007). Corruption has been observed to heighten the effects of all social and
geographic factors in relation to whether a state will become a transit state,
making it the most relevant factor (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2016;
Boivin, 2014; De Danieli, 2014; Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia et al., 2012);
Sabatelle, 2011; Wyler & Cook, 2011; Emmers, 2003; Layne et al., 2001; Sands,
2007; Swanstorm, 2007). Coinciding with Boivin (2013), the current study argues
that the combination of the factors mentioned throughout rather than individually
enable the transshipment of illicit drugs.
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Current Study
Internal and external factors that facilitate the use of a country for illicit
drug transshipment operations as a transit state warrant scholarly attention. It is
evident that illicit drug trafficking as a whole is a risky business, and despite the
policies meant to curb the illicit activity, its lucrative nature continues to attract
individuals. For every seizure made in a country known to operate as a transit
state, many more go unnoticed (Caulkins, 2009). Understanding what facilitates
the use of a country as a transit state for transshipment operations is important
because identifying specific factors provides direction for interdiction and crime
prevention efforts at two socio-political levels—national and international.
Limited research investigates the attributes of countries positioned as
transshipment points in the transnational flow of illicit drugs. The majority of
research available focuses on a specific country, region, or drug type, limiting the
scope of the problem. For that reason, this study seeks to observe the
transshipment of illicit drugs by aggregating all data available into one network
for the selected observation period. Doing so generates a more comprehensive
understanding of transit states. The study aims to highlight which factors are
more highly correlated with transshipment positioning across illicit drug trade
networks. The primary goal of this study is to identify what factors are more
predictive of being a transit state within transnational illicit drug flow based on
characteristics commonly referenced in academic literature to be facilitators.

17

Thinking about the transnational illicit drug trade as a network of countries,
linked by the flow of drugs, it is possible to identify key transshipment nations.
Extrapolating from the small world perspective, central countries operate as
critical bridges linking networks, as such, transit states should be those most
central countries in the illicit drug trafficking networks. Since drug traffickers
decide where to route drug shipments, Reuter and Kleiman (1989) assert that the
transshipment countries selected should exhibit characteristics that are most
likely to minimize risks and maximize profit. Four factors are associated with
transshipment countries—social connectivity among countries measured with
migrant population, geographic proximity captured as border connectivity,
economic benefit as indicated by drug-price mark-ups, and political climate—as
reflected by the perceived level of and control of corruption. The following six
hypotheses emerge from the literature:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of corruption in a country, the more
likely it is to be a transit state.
Hypothesis 2: Transit states have more border connectivity in comparison
to countries that are not transit states.
Hypothesis 3: Transit states have larger migrant population percentages in
comparison to countries that are not transit states.
Hypothesis 4: Transit states have lower drug price mark-up percentages in
comparison to countries that are not transit states.
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Hypothesis 5: Corruption is the most significant identifying marker of
transit state designation.
Hypothesis 6: The same countries are positioned as transit states within
the illicit drug transshipment network irrespective of illicit drug
examined (e.g., heroin, cocaine).
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

This chapter describes the various components of the study. This
investigation used a non-experimental cross-sectional design to identify which
factors best explain the positional attributes of transit states situated within
country-to-country transshipment networks. Six years of seizure data were
aggregated to map the international drug flow and to identify countries operating
as transit states. Using centrality metrics, transit states were identified as those
best positioned in the network to serve as hubs or bridges along transshipment
paths. Aggregated data can obscure drug-specific patterns; therefore, cocaine
only and heroin trafficking networks were compared. Descriptive and multivariate
analyses are run for each network.

Primary Data Source and Network Generation
Transshipment networks were generated from the United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Individual Drug Seizure Cases data set. The UNODC
is a division of the United Nations that gathers data on drugs and crime at an
international level. The data set records the location of seizures that took place
from 2013 to 2016. The report also includes data on the region, sub-region,
country, administrative division, place, and date a drug seizure occurred. Also
reported is the drug type, amount, unit packed in, how and where it was hidden,
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and how it was transported. Where the drug was produced, where it was sent
from, where it was meant to arrive, and the route used are also reported.
Seizure data was used to generate three networks. The aggregated drug
network (network one) represents all and any reported drug seizures that took
place from 2013 to 2016 — the additional two networks record seizures involving
cocaine only (cocaine network) and heroin only (heroin network) derivatives.
Drug specific networks permit the identification of differences, if any, to be
observed among countries serving as transit states due to the type of product
being handled.
All networks were single-mode and directed. Actors (nodes) represent
countries reported to have seized illicit drugs, and ties (directed arcs) connect
origin and destination countries involved in the seizure. Thus, the drug trafficking
networks map country-to-country links, by connecting the country from which a
drug ships and the country where the seizure of drug shipment occurred. A tie
exists only when the location of the departure country and the receiving country
was specified (refer to Figure 1 for a snapshot of IDS data set). Since
connectivity was based on relational events, drug seizures, the network
represents an observed flow of drug trafficking.
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Figure 1. Individual Drug Seizure Data Set Snapshot.

The most significant limitations affecting the comprehensiveness of this
data set are (1) that agencies report on a voluntary basis, and (2) that illicit drugs
pass through borders undetected. The capacity and willingness of countries to
detect international illicit drug shipments and report on drug seizures may be a
byproduct of several factors—e.g., border control resources, political stability,
and drug control policy. Consequently, the full scope of the transnational illicit
drug trade is not known. Nonetheless, prior studies have relied on UNODC data
(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et al., 2017; Boivin, 2014, 2013), and this
source is considered to be one of the most comprehensive data sets involving
international drug trafficking.
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable was transit state designation. As the focus of the
study was on countries operating as transit states, the dependent variable
identified which countries were more central across transshipment networks, and
thus, functioned in a structural way as transit states. For the purposes of this
study, a transit state was operationalized as a country that exhibits in-degree,
out-degree, and betweenness centrality. Only countries with high scores on all
three forms of centrality were designated a transit state.
In-degree and Out-degree Centrality
The first two metrics were derived from degree centrality, which measured
how central a node relating to the number of ties they had within a network
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). There are two forms of degree centrality, in-degree,
and out-degree (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Only normalized score values were
used. For the mathematical equations of in-degree (top equation) and out-degree
(bottom equation) centrality, refer to Figure 2 (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

!

!!
𝐶′! 𝑛! =    !!!
  

𝐶′! 𝑛! =   

𝑥!!
𝑔−1

Figure 2. Equations for Degree Centrality.
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In-degree centrality refers to the number of edges (interactions) in which a
node is a receiver (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Out-degree centrality refers to
the number of edges in which the node is the sender (Wasserman & Faust,
1994). An actor is the most central when either it has the most incoming or
outgoing ties, depending on the measure selected (refer to Figure 3 for visual
representation).

Figure 3. Degree Centrality Visual.

These measures of degree centrality accounted for the number of ties a
node has while accounting for directionality (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Doing
so was important because it can alter ones' perception of a structure, potentially
leading to false inferences about a networks' structure and functionality
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In the study, degree centrality accounted for the
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number of interactions (drug seizures) experienced by countries within the
generated network. In-degree centrality accounted for the number of times a
country received a drug shipment (resulting in a seizure), while out-degree
centrality accounted for the number of times a country sent a drug shipment.
Scores obtained from degree centrality metrics are calculated using a valued
network. Meaning the number of countries involved in a network were accounted
for, in addition to the reported number of drug seizures taking place on any given
path.
Betweenness Centrality
The third centrality measure was betweenness centrality, which measured
how central a node is relating to its' positional importance within a network
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Betweenness centrality accounts for centrality by
calculating the number of times a particular actor appeared on any given path to
connect to another actor within the same network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Only normalized score values were used. Refer to Figure 6 for betweenness
centrality equation.

𝐶′! 𝑛! =   

𝐶! (𝑛! )
(𝑔 − 1)(𝑔 − 2)
2

Figure 4. Equation for Betweenness Centrality
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Betweenness centrality assumes that an actor is centrally based on how
favored it is in relation to other actors within the network. Actors identified as
having high betweenness centrality are often referred to as bridges, as they lie
between and connect with other various actors. According to betweenness
centrality, an actor is most central in a network when it appears numerous times
on paths to lead to a connection with other actors (refer to Figure 8 for a visual
representation).

Figure 5. Betweenness Centrality Visual.

For the study, betweenness centrality accounted for the number of times a
country was positioned on the shortest paths among others who may be sending
and receiving a drug shipment. This measure of centrality helps to highlight
countries with the heaviest drug flow within a network. To account for the
directionality of flow, a directed version betweenness centrality is used.
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Why Combine Centrality Metrics?
Using a combination of centrality metrics identified crucial actors based on
multiple concepts of centrality. Doing so was useful, as relying on a single
centrality measure would have led to different inferences about which actor is the
most important in a network (refer to Table 1). Accounting for three different
network centrality measures highlights crucial actors in any given network. For
the purpose of this study, only countries exhibiting all three forms of centrality
were classed as transit states. This is how the dependent variable was identified.
Furthermore, the combination of centrality metrics allowed for countries classed
as transit states to be ranked. Ranking of classed transit states was done by
summing only normalized values of the centrality scores found (refer to Table 2).

Table 1. Why Combine Centrality Metrics?
Node

In-Degree

Out-Degree

Betweenness

A

100.000

66.667

58.333

B

33.333

66.667

0

C

0

33.333

8.333

D

66.667

33.333

8.333
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Table 2. Combination of Centrality Metrics Allows Ranking
Node

Classed as Transit
State?

Combined Total

Ranking

A

Yes (3)

225.612

1

B

No (2)

100.282

.

C

No (2)

42.189

.

D

Yes (3)

108.856

2

Prior research supports the use of various centrality measures to assess
the importance of actors within a network (Berlusconi et al., 2017; Giommoni et
al., 2017; Leuprecht, Aulthouse, & Walther, 2016; Bright & Delaney, 2013; Bright,
Hughes, & Chalmers, 2012; Malm & Bichler, 2011). Centrality depends on
context, and by combing various centrality measures, actors highlighted are
representative of more than one element of centrality (Bichler, 2019). This
allowed for a better-rounded assessment of an actors’ true importance within a
network in relation to others.

Country Attributes and Data Sources
The study examined the degree of influence a country’s migrant
population, drug price mark-ups, border connectivity, and corruption had (if any)
on whether a country was central across transshipment networks, thus
functioning as a transit state (refer to Table 3). Support for these attribute
variables was available across academic literature to varying degrees. The
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selected attribute variables represented important factors discussed in the
literature review observed to influence drug flow across transshipment
operations.
Data for the study came from five different sources (see Table 3). Data
collected allowed us to develop country related attributes (similar to independent
variables in conventional research methods). Sources include Transparency
International, the World Bank, the CIA World Fact Book, The United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) division, and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Data provided by selected
sources are secondary. For descriptive statistics on attribute variables refer to
Table 4. A brief description and potential limitations of each data source follows.

Table 3. Attribute Variables
Variable

Source

Factor

Migrant Population

UNDESA

Social

Border Connectivity

CIA WF

Geographic

Drug Price Mark-Up

UNODC

Economic

Perceived Corruption

TI

Political

Control of Corruption

World Bank

Political

Note: CIA World Factbook (CIA WF); Transparency International (TI); United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA).
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Attribute Variables
Variable

N

Min.

Max.

Mean

Std. Dev

Migrant Population

164

0

87

9.711

14.422

Border Connectivity

164

0

15

3.430

2.727

Cocaine Mark-Up

164

0

99.094

50.987

23.339

Heroin Mark-Up

164

0

95.233

42.272

21.939

Perceived Corruption

164

9

91

43.570

19.370

Control of Corruption

164

0

9

4.51

2.017

Migrant Population
The first variable was migrant population percentage, which reflected the
known migrant population of a given country. The variable captured which
percentage of the population in any given country that was foreign born, meaning
they were not born in the country they resided. High rates of social proximity
between nations have been argued to serve as pillars for illicit activity to take
place (Giommoni et al., 2017; Bybee 2012).
Data for this variable came from the International Migrant Stock (IMS) data
set. Information for this data was compiled by the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA); a division of the United Nations
responsible for gathering data on population and development of countries
around the globe. Data collection for the data set was done in conjunction with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Based on official statistics
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identified by the agency division, information on migrant stocks was available for
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2015, and 2017.
The greatest limitation to this data set is that annual data is not available
for every year within the study’s period. The relevance of social proximity is
identified as a major influencer of drug flow; therefore, IMS estimates provided
for 2015 will be used for all of the annual networks included in the study. The
accuracy of totals and stated origins is limited, being that migrant populations
tend to shy away from official organizations and agencies. Even so, the UNDESA
is one of the few divisions with the demonstrated ability to track international
migrant flow.
Accounting for a country’s migrant population percentage allowed us to
observe the influence of social proximity. Data for migrant population percentage
came from the IMS data set. Migrant population percentage was coded as ratio;
estimates of reported migrant population percentages were coded as exact
numbers given. IMS data for 2015 served as the migrant population estimate for
all networks generated and provided the percent of which the population in any
given country reported to belong to a migrant community. Descriptive statistics of
this variable are available in Table 4.
Border Connectivity
The second variable was border connectivity, which captured how
connected a country is based on the number of borders it shares with other
countries. Boivin (2014) identified how countries with numerous shared borders
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are able to generate more profit at a lower risk in comparison to those with fewer
borders. Data is taken from the CIA World Factbook to generate a country-tocountry attribute file. The CIA World Factbook is a source produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency that provides information on countries around the
world. Their land boundaries publication accounts for the number of borders a
given country shares with others.
Accounting for border connectivity allowed us to observe the influence of
geographic proximity. Border connectivity was coded as ratio, reflecting the exact
number of shared borders a country had. To generate a score for each country,
the number of borders it shared with other countries was included in the study.
Descriptive statistics of this variable are available in Table 4.
Drug Price Mark-Up
The third variable was drug price mark-ups, which captured the rate at
which a drug bought at the wholesale value was marked up when selling at the
retail value. Studies have found that countries in which drug price mark-ups were
relatively low are indicative of a high-profit margin for individuals involved in the
transshipment of illicit drugs (Giommoni et al., 2017; Boivin, 2014; Reuter, 2014;
Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). Accounting for drug price mark-ups allowed us to
explore economic factors that relate to profit maximization. Data was taken from
the Retail and Wholesale Drug prices data set to create an attribute file. The
UNODC compiles information for this data set as well, which contains information
on the sale value of illicit drugs around the world. Information on illicit drug prices
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were available for 2013 to 2016. The data set identified the rate at which drugs
went in different countries and provided a low to max range at which illicit drugs
sell based on the unit, along with the average price that a specific illicit drug sold
for in each nation. Data obtained on drug price mark-ups are coded as ratio,
allowing us to capture the true value and to generate accurate mark-up
percentages.
The given dollar amount may not truly reflect the worth of a product in the
country it is being sold in. Meaning, a product can be worth more or less in one
nation, but because of the currency exchange rate during any given year, its
value may be different in the United States. Nonetheless, approximations are
useful as the monetary gain is what drives the illicit drug market. Provided dollar
amounts are standardized and adjusted for inflation using the United States
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistic Customer Price Index Inflation
Calculator prior to calculating wholesale to retail price mark-up percentage. To
calculate the drug price mark-up percentage, the retail cost is deducted from the
wholesale price and then divided the sum by the retail cost. This provided us with
the whole to retail mark-up percentage. Descriptive statistics of this variable are
available in Table 4.
Corruption
Both the level of perceived corruption and the level of control of corruption
in a given country are used to measure corruption. It has been observed that
individuals involved in drug trafficking tend to operate where the risk is lower
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(Berlusconi et al., 2017; Leuprecht et al., 2016; Boivin, 2014; De Danieli, 2014;
Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Miraglia et al., 2012; Sabatelle, 2011; Wyler & Cook,
2011; Emmers, 2003; Layne et al., 2001; Sands, 2007; Swanstorm, 2007). By
accounting for corruption, political factors relating to risk can be explored.
Data was taken from the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reports
to create the perceived corruption attribute file. Transparency International, an
organization that captures information on the perceived level of corruption within
a country produces the reports. The annual CPI reports provide a corruption
score based on how corrupt the public sector of a given country is believed to be.
Data for these particular reports were available from 1995 to 2018. Reports
include a ranking of the nations included and the number of sources that used to
generate individual estimates. Descriptive statistics of this variable are available
in Table 4. Not every country had data listed for them. To account for missing
data, the median CPI value is used for countries where data was not available.
Additionally, calculated scores stem from relatively small sample sizes. Caution
was taken when interpreting scores provided by the CPI.
Data was also taken from The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
project to create the control of corruption attribute file. The World Bank, a
financial institution that funds projects in developing countries around the globe
intending to ending poverty, also funds the WGI project. The WGI report includes
data on six aspects believed to influence the ability of a government to function
effectively. Of interest is the Control of Corruption aspect (CCI). The CCI
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provided information on the perceived level of corruption based on the believed
extent that public power is used as a means for personal gain. The WGI project
captured data from 1996 to 2017 and provides estimates for whether a country
has weak or strong governance, signaling whether a nations’ government is or is
not influenced by corruption. Descriptive statistics of this variable are available in
Table 4.
Scores provided by CCI will be interpreted with caution as well. Like the
CPI reports, CCI data is limited, and scores stem small samples. For countries
where data was not available, the median CCI value was used. Both measures
for corruption were interpreted together to produce greater results. Corruption
was coded as both an interval and ratio. Data obtained from CPI were coded as
interval, scores of perceived corruption range from zero (very clean) to 100
(highly corrupt). Data obtained from CCI were coded as interval, scores of control
of corruption range from zero (high control) to nine (low control).

Analytic Plan
Network visuals were created using NetDraw and descriptive statistics
calculated with UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Centrality
metrics (in-degree centrality, out-degree centrality, and betweenness centrality)
were run for each network individually using UCINET as well. Doing so allowed
for data within each network to be evaluated independently of one another. The
combination of centrality metrics allowed for the dependent variables to be
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identified. In addition to identifying the top ten percent of countries classed as
transit states across the three networks.
Next, variables were assessed for multicollinearity. The concept of
multicollinearity refers to when a set of incorporated attribute variables in a given
study are highly correlated with one another (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). This is
problematic as it affects the results and their potential significance (Hanneman &
Riddle, 2005). Upon running a correlation statistic on the set of attribute
variables, it was determined that they were not highly correlated. From there, I
moved on to a multivariate regression analysis.
A Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) was used to assess the extent
that corruption, border connectivity, migrant population, and drug price mark-up
in a given country influences transit state designation. QAP is a two-part process
in which an initial regression is run, followed by multiple regression permutations
to account for standard error (Hanneman & Riddle, 2011). A QAP is ideal for this
study as the model recognizes that the actors involved in the network are not
necessarily independent from one another (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). By
incorporating a multiple regression analysis, all five attribute variables are
assessed in relation to the dependent variable at the same time. This allowed the
value of how much an independent variable impacts the dependent variable to be
calculated during the observation period.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

Network Descriptors
Aggregated Drug Seizure Network
The Aggregated Drug Seizure (ADS) Network consisted of 164 countries.
While more than 100 different types of drugs were seized, approximately 70% of
seizures captured in the ADS network involved cocaine or heroin derivatives.
Network characteristics are provided in Table 5. The network included 696
unique ties, reflecting the number of relationships between countries reported
within the observed period. Important to note that reflexive ties are not accounted
for when observing unique ties. The observed ties accounted for directionality
(reflected in the arrows), indicating whether a country was on the sending or
receiving end. With an observed density of 73%, more than half of the countries
involved in the ADS Network were connected to one another, indicating
moderate cohesion (see Table 6). Metrics describing network size and structural
properties were calculated with UCINET 61.
1

Using UCINET and NetDraw characteristics pertaining to a networks size and
their structural properties were calculated. For information pertaining to a
networks size, refer to Table 5. For information pertaining to a networks
structure, refer to Table 6. Size and structural information is provided for all three
networks to better understand them. Using UCINET and NetDraw characteristics
pertaining to a networks size and their structural properties were calculated. For
information pertaining to a networks size, refer to Table 5. For information
pertaining to a networks structure, refer to Table 5. Size and structural
information is provided for all three networks to better understand them.
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Table 5. Characteristics of Networks Generated
Network Type

Total
Ties

Unique
Ties

Actors

Components

Actors’ Main
Component

Aggregated Drug
Seizure Network

26732

696

164

1

100%

Cocaine Drug
Seizure Network

10920

291

105

1

100%

Heroin Drug
Seizure Network

7656

151

87

3

86.4%

Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Networks Generated
Network Type

Density

Average Out/In
Degree (SD)

Normed Average
Out/In Degree (SD)

Out/In Degree
Centralization

Aggregated Drug
Seizure Network

73.5%

119 (379.03) /
119 (687.34)

0.02 (0.08) /
0.02 (0.14)

0.62% /
1.25%

Cocaine Drug
Seizure Network

51.1%

53 (217.20) /
53 (307.94)

0.06 (0.23) /
0.06 (0.32)

1.69% /
3.04

Heroin Drug
Seizure Network

11.2%

9.73 (28.16) /
9.73 (24.69)

0.13 (0.37) /
0.13 (0.32)

2.86% /
1.59%

The aggregated network is illustrated in Figure 6. Each node (circular
figures) in the network represent countries involved in the transshipment of illicit
drugs, and the ties linking them represent a relationship between any two
countries. All colored nodes represent countries classed as transit states; those
in yellow represent countries identified to operate in the top ten percent.
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Figure 6. Aggregated Drug Seizure Network 2013-2016

Cocaine Network
The Cocaine Drug Seizure (CDS) Network consisted of 104 countries and
made up 41% of all reported drug seizures during the selected time frame.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5 above, and the network is illustrated
in Figure 7. All colored nodes represent countries classed as transit states; those
in yellow represent countries identified to operate in the top ten percent. The
network captures 291 unique ties, reflecting the number of observed
relationships between countries included. With an observed density of 51%,
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more than half of the countries involved in the CDS Network were connected to
one another, indicating weak to moderate cohesion (see Table 6). Important to
note that reflexive ties are not accounted for when observing unique ties.

Figure 7. Cocaine Drug Seizure Network 2013-2016

Heroin Network
The Heroin Drug Seizure (HDS) Network consisted of 87 countries, with
unique 151 ties spread amongst three components. The HDS network made up
29% of all reported drug seizures during the selected time frame. Important to
note that reflexive ties are not accounted for when observing unique ties. All
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colored nodes represent countries classed as transit states; those in yellow
represent countries identified to operate in the top ten percent. Descriptive
statistics are provided in Table 5 above, and the network is illustrated in Figure 8.
Component one, the smallest, consisted of two countries, capturing a single tie.
Component two, the second smallest, consisted of nine countries, capturing eight
ties. While component three, the largest and main component, consisted of 76
countries and captures unique 142 ties. With an observed density of 11%, only a
few countries involved in the HDS Network were connected to one another,
indicating weak cohesion (see Table 6).
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Figure 8. Heroin Drug Seizure Network 2013-2016

Combination of Social Network Analysis (SNA) Metrics
The combination of SNA metrics led to the designation of 62 countries as
transit states within the ADS network, 27 countries in the CDS network, and 25
countries in the HDS network (refer to Table 7). Spain headed the AGS and CDS
networks, falling in second in the HDS network. Pakistan, which is classed as a
transit state the AGS top ten percent and in the overall CDS network, headed the
HDS network. Austria, India, Italy, and Spain were observed in the top ten
percent as transit states across all three networks. For the ranking of the top ten
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percent countries classed as transit states refer to Table 8. Nine countries were
observed to overlap across the three networks as transit states (countries
italicized in Table 7).

Table 7. Countries Classed as Transit States
Aggregated Network
(n=62)
Algeria
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Bosnia &
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Colombia
Croatia
Cuba
Czech Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Italy
Kazakhstan
Laos
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau

Macedonia
Malaysia
Malta
Mexico
Montenegro
Morocco
Myanmar
Netherlands
Nigeria
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad & Tobago
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Cocaine Network
(n=27)
Austria
Colombia
Cuba
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Germany
Ghana
Hungary
India
Italy
Lithuania
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Trinidad & Tobago
Venezuela

Heroin Network
(n=25)
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Egypt
Germany
India
Iran
Italy
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Macedonia
Malaysia
Myanmar
Netherlands
Nigeria
Pakistan
Portugal
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Tajikistan
Tanzania
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan

Note: Italicized countries are present as transit states across the three networks
generated.
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Table 8. Top Ten Percent Transit States by Network Type
Aggregated Network
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Spain
Ecuador
Colombia
India
Portugal
Morocco
Egypt
Thailand
Austria
Latvia
Italy
Myanmar
Pakistan
Romania
Bulgaria
Macau

Cocaine Network
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Spain
Ecuador
Colombia
Romania
Dominican Republic
Austria
Portugal
Italy
Germany
Philippines
India

Heroin Network
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Pakistan
Spain
Austria
Italy
Bulgaria
India
Belgium
Germany
Netherlands

Note: Italicized countries are present as transit states operating in the top ten
percent across the three networks generated.

Inter-item Correlations
Prior to running a Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) a diagnostic
check was conducted on independent attribute variables to identify if any were
correlate highly with one another. No variables were found to highly correlate
with one another (refer to Table 9).
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Table 9. Similarities Check Results
Variable
Migrant
Population
Border
Connectivity
Drug Price MarkUp
Perceived
Corruption
Control of
Corruption

Migrant
Population
1

Border
Connectivity
-0.279

Drug Price
Mark-Up
0.079

Perceived
Corruption
-0.280

Control of
Corruption
-0.422

-0.279

1

-0.143

0.228

0.392

0.079

-0.143

1

-0.049

-0.056

-0.280

0.228

-0.049

1

0.544

-0.422

0.392

-0.056

0.544

1

Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP)
Table 10 reports the results of three QAP regression models. The first
model focuses on the aggregated drug network, the second model focuses on
the cocaine drug network, and the third model focuses on the heroin drug
network. Regression coefficients computed were based on 10,000 permutations
reflecting potential outcomes.
Model fit varied. The explanatory variables accounted for 24% of variance
in the dependent variable when looking at the ADS network. That percentage
dropped to 20% when looking at the HDS network, and then to 12% when
looking at the CDS network. Despite the low r squared coefficients, significant
results were obtained. QAP outputs identified three of the five variables
significant as to varying degrees (refer to Table 10).
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Migrant Population Percentage
A negative relationship is observed between a country’s migrant
population percentage and their likeliness of being classed as a transit state
(refer to Table 10). This means that nations with a higher percentage of migrants
were less likely to be among the most central transit nations in the drug
distribution network, as revealed by seizure data. Failing to achieve significance
at a p<.05 level, it was not possible to reject a null hypothesis.
Notably, the relationship approached significance for the cocaine network,
suggesting that countries involved in the transshipment of cocaine do not have
large migrant populations. When observing the heroin network, the relationship
once again failed to achieve significance, and it was not possible to reject the null
hypothesis.
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Table 10. Quadratic Assignment Procedure Regression Models for Transit
Country Designation
Aggregated Network

Cocaine Network

Beta

SE

P. Sig

Beta

SE

P. Sig

Beta

SE

P. Sig

-0.150

0.004

0.016

-0.159

0.003

0.012

---

---

---

-0.101

0.004

0.112

---

---

---

-0.202

0.003

0.001

Perception of
Corruption

0.390

0.008

0.000

0.213

0.007

0.069

0.338

0.006

0.005

Control of
Corruption

0.266

0.079

0.028

0.061

0.071

0.645

0.194

0.066

0.121

Border
Connectivity

0.321

0.028

0.000

0.238

0.025

0.001

0.360

0.023

0.000

-0.103

0.004

0.115

-0.124

0.004

0.072

-0.029

0.004

0.662

235

---

---

235

---

---

235

---

---

0.241

---

---

0.122

---

---

0.209

---

---

13.377
0.000

-----

-----

7.502
0.000

-----

-----

13.350
0.000

-----

-----

Variables

Cocaine
Price Markup %
Heroin Price
Mark-up %

Migrant
Population %
Overall
Regression
Fit
N
Adj. Rsquare
F
Prob. > F

Heroin Network

Drug Price Mark-up
A negative relationship is observed between a country’s drug price
markup and their likeliness of being classed as a transit state (refer to Table 10).
Based on the results, it can be inferred that countries with lower drug price markups are likely to be central to the transshipment of illicit drugs. When observing
the ADS network, only the relationship between cocaine drug mark-ups achieved
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significance. However, the relationship achieved significance at a p<.05 for the
CDS and HDS networks. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
Corruption
Two modes of corruption were used to assess corruption is a marker of
countries embedded in the transshipment of illicit drugs—the level of perceived
corruption and the level of perceived control of corruption. When assessing
corruption through the level of perceived corruption in a country, a positive
relationship is observed (refer to Table 10). Based on this measure, it appears
that countries exhibiting higher levels of corruption are likely to be central to the
transshipment of illicit drugs. A positive relationship is also found when assessing
corruption through the level of perceived control of corruption in a country (refer
to Table 10). By this measure, countries identified as having higher levels of
corruption, due to their lower levels of perceived control of corruption, are likely to
be central to the transshipment of illicit drugs.
The relationship between both measures achieved significance at a p<.05
in the ADS network. Thus, leading us to reject the null hypothesis. Corruption
appears to have limited influence with potential transit states in the CDS network,
as both measures failed to achieve significance. When looking at the HDS
network, only the level of perceived corruption achieved significance at a p<.05
level.
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Border Connectivity
A positive relationship is found between a country’s border connectivity
and their likelihood of being classed as a transit state (refer to Table 10). Based
on the results, it can be inferred that countries embedded in the transshipment of
illicit drugs are marked as having high border connectivity. Meaning the more
borders a country shares with other countries, the likelier it is to operate as a
transit state.
This relationship achieved significance at a p<.05 across all three
networks and is the only variable with such an effect. As a result, the null
hypothesis is rejected. Of the five attributes, border connectivity is found to have
the most influence on whether a country is to operate as a transit state, making it
the most important marker.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the importance social, geographic, economic, and
political factors that have the potential of serving as predictive markers for
identifying transits states already embedded in international drug trafficking. In
analyzing drug seizure data reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) this study mapped and compared countries central to the
transshipment of illicit drugs generally, and more specifically, heroin and cocaine.
Doing so allowed a test of five possible facilitating factors—migrant population in
a country, border connectivity, drug price mark-ups, and corruption—that might
account for countries centrally positioned within illicit trade networks. While the
explanatory variables did not account for all the variance in the dependent
variable, it did account for a significant amount. The findings confirm that transit
states do share similar characteristics—even if to varying degrees, which can
also serve as identifying markers.

Main Findings
This study posed six hypotheses predicting how a country’s migrant
population, their border connectivity, drug price mark-up observed, and perceived
level of corruption would be associated with being positioned as a central actor
for the transshipment of illicit drugs. Mapping drug seizures reported to the
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United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime between 2013 and 2016 resulted in the
following conclusions.
Hypothesis 1
Corruption was present in countries operating as transit states and served
as a significant predictive marker for identifying them. Thus, confirming the first
hypothesis—the higher the degree of corruption in a country, the more likely it is
to be a transit state. This finding is consistent with prior research focusing on the
European region and South East Asia (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Emmers, 2003).
Prior research has also observed the role of corruption in countries like El
Salvador, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, where its presence led to the targeting of
these countries to function as transit states (Miraglia et al., 2012; Layne et al.,
2001). Countries exhibiting higher levels of corruption offer drug traffickers more
security at a lesser price, contributing to why such countries are sought for the
transshipment of illicit narcotics (Caulkins, 2009).
Hypothesis 2
High border connectivity was present in countries operating as transit
states and served as a significant predictive marker for identifying them.
Therefore, countries with numerous shared borders are more likely to function as
transit states embedded in international drug trafficking. This finding confirms the
second hypothesis—transit states have more border connectivity in comparison
to countries that are not transit states.
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Academic literature supports the influence of high border connectivity,
noting that it preserves costs associated with risks and transportation (Boivin,
2014). The value of a country’s high border connectivity is observed in Turkey,
where its vast region enables individuals to trek a great distance without running
into institutional controls (Ekici & Ozbay, 2013; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012).
Hypothesis 3
The migrant population percentage did not influence whether a country
operated as a transit state. Therefore, the influence of migrant population
percentage was not observed as a significant identifying marker for transit states
embedded in international drug trafficking. While it was hypothesized that—
transit states have larger migrant populations in comparison to countries that are
not transit states—a determination was not possible due to lack of significant
results.
Despite this finding, a study done by Sands (2007) found that large
migrant populations in a given country do facilitate the presence of illicit
organized crime, particularly Spain. The presence of ethnic enclaves and
communities across various countries are noted to work as facilitating factors,
being that they reduce risk itself and price associated to risk (Berlusconi et al.,
2017; Giommoni et al., 2017; Toktas & Selimoglu, 2012; Sabatelle, 2011;
Caulkins, 2009). Lack of support for the migrant population percentage in the
study may be due to the variable simply focusing on the size of a community
rather than the strength of ties shared.
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Hypothesis 4
Drug price mark-ups influence whether a country is to operate as a transit
state. The selling price of an illicit product represents the ease at which it moves
across any given network (Reuter & Kleiman, 1989). The study observed drug
price mark-ups as a significant identifying marker for identifying transit states.
The finding confirms the fourth hypothesis—transit states have lower mark-up
percentages in comparison to countries that are not transit states.
The higher the risk, the higher the drug price mark-up to account for the
price of risk involved, reducing the economic return for those involved (Boivin,
2013, 2014). These results suggest that there is less of a drug price mark-up in
countries operating as transit states, which may suggest that the risk of seizure
or apprehension is minimal (Boivin, 2014). The influence of drug price mark-up
cost, however, is not relevant to transit states involved in the transshipment of
heroin products. Giommoni et al. (2017) note how, when observing the
transshipment of heroin, various countries are involved, increasing the size of the
heroin drug market and reducing the effect of the cost associated. It is plausible
that other factors relating to risk influence of drug price mark-ups, such as market
size or consumption rates in a given country.
Hypothesis 5
While corruption serves as a significant marker for identifying transit states
embedded in international trafficking, it is not the most important. Border
connectivity, unlike corruption, proved significant across all three networks
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generated, making it the most significant marker, and corruption the second.
While it was hypothesized that corruption would be the most significant
identifying marker of transit state designation, the study failed to confirm the
hypothesis.
While academic literature discusses and identifies corruption more widely
as a facilitating factor (Maftei, 2012; Wyler & Cook, 2011), the present study
found the impact of border connectivity to be more pronounced. The data
revealed that the more shared borders a country had, the likelier is to act as a
transit state, in relation to the level of corruption taking place within that country’s
borders. This makes sense, as countries with higher border connectivity are
likelier to suffer from weak or inefficient border control, making them the ideal
transit state as they literally bridge multiple countries to one another. A country
with numerous borders is not limited by the will of single individual, and offers
more than one entry and exit point. A corrupt country offers an illicit drug a way
in, but not necessarily a way out, while a country with numerous borders offers
both advantages.
Hypothesis 6
Different countries were found to operate as transit states across each of
the drug networks generated. Great differences were noted in the top ten percent
of countries operating as transit states. While it was hypothesized that—the
same countries will be positioned as transit states within the illicit drug
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transshipment network irrespective of illicit drug examined (e.g., heroin,
cocaine)—the study was unable to confirm the hypothesis.
In reducing the number of drug types captured in a network, the number of
potential countries involved was also reduced. Differences in countries identified
as transit states can be attributed to differences in the significance of the
selected attribute variables across each of the networks. The majority of cocainebased products are produced in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia—all of which are in
South America (Global Financial Integrity, 2017). Roughly 50 countries are
involved in the production of opium-based products, with Afghanistan producing
roughly 70% of the available product (Global Financial Integrity, 2017). Unlike
cocaine, opium is produced in numerous regions (the Middle East, Asia, Latin
America), involving more countries in the transshipment of the product.

Implications
The transshipment of illicit drugs, despite being a small part of the drugmarket commodity chain, is an important aspect deserving of attention. By
observing the avenues in which illicit drugs are trafficked, it is possible to
understand why those particular avenues are selected and how to disrupt drug
flow. This study not only reveals how certain characteristics heighten the
likeliness of a given country to function as a transit state but also sheds light on
the lack of efficient reporting practices that hinder these types of observations.
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In using data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime it was
revealed how certain countries appear to report more than others. It is possible
that countries like Spain are identified as crucial actors in transshipment
operations due to their high reporting. However, Spain’s level of reporting, and
the lack of reporting by other major suspected transit states may heighten the
role played by Spain and other nations with strong reporting practices.
Incentivizing or mounting collaborative efforts to strengthen border screening
capabilities would improve the identification of illicit drug shipments. In addition,
administrative support may be needed to enhance the capacity to accurately
report the results of drug interdiction efforts.
High border connectivity, high perceived corruption, and low drug price
mark-ups are all significant markers for identifying countries that are operating as
central transit states, or with the potential to do so. Of the three, border
connectivity is the most influential identifying marker. Countries with high border
connectivity often have more traffic and are less able to provide adequate
resources to all their border entry points, inadvertently making it easier to
smuggle illicit goods (Trumbore & Woo, 2014; Ekici & Ozbay, 2013; Toktas &
Selimoglu, 2012). Therefore, efforts aimed to aid countries as it relates to them
operating as transit states should focus on strengthening controls at their
borders. Doing so will minimize both entry and exit points provided by any given
country, increasing risk and the price of risk for those involved in the
transshipment of any type of illicit good.
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Furthermore, depending on the type of drug product being trafficked,
different countries operate as key players and transit states. However, there were
a few countries present across the three networks. Of those in the top ten
percent, the study observed three countries operating as transit states,
regardless of the drug type involved—Spain, Austria, and Italy. Efforts to curb
participation in the transshipment of illicit drugs would benefit from zoning in on
countries, such as these, and identifying why involvement for some countries is
not limited by drug type.

Limitations
It is important to acknowledge that several limitations arose throughout the
course of this study. Some of which could influence conclusions made. Of note,
the primary data source used for this study contains information that is provided
on a voluntary basis. Agencies reporting seizures do so because they want to,
and information they report is not fact-checked. As a result, certain countries
were more represented in the drug seizure networks since they were avid
reporters.
Furthermore, a country in which a seizure took place is only present in
networks generated if the sending country is known. Countries, like Afghanistan,
despite a seizure having taken place there are not present in the study, as all the
seizure data linked to Afghanistan did not provide information on who sent a
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shipment. It is important to acknowledge that results of this study may not be
truly representative, being that some major transit states did not appear.
Lastly, another limitation pertains to why significance was not achieved for
the migrant population variable. While it was the goal to obtain more information
on the origin of migrant populations in any given country, data available was
severely limited. Therefore, the variable of migrant population as coded in this
study captured more the size of a migrant population than its strength of
attachment to any given country.

Future Research
Future research relating to countries involved in the transshipment of illicit
drugs can benefit from the following suggestions. First, future research will
benefit by incorporating various sources into their data to map international drug
flow. Network generation based on data derived from a single source runs a risk
that the network is not comprehensive. Thus, affecting the identification of key
actors and structural properties. Many studies have relied on the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime. However, the data sets available are limiting, as the
information provided is incomplete. The integration of various sources to
generate and map a network of international drug flow would enable a wider
scope of analysis to take place, as more countries would be included.
Additionally, future research will benefit from incorporating different
variables from the ones applied in this study. While it is known that transit states
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share similar characteristics, there is still debate to the degree that some of them
influence their participation across transshipment operations. Future research
would benefit from better operationalizing variables under observation, and by
controlling for variables that relate to political, social, geographic, and economic
factors. Such as, controlling for the influence of port flow and openness, while
assessing border connectivity. Perhaps even controlling for the rate at which
money is laundered in a country while assessing economic driving factors and
even corruption.
Even by assessing variables already observed in the literature but from
different angles would benefit future research. This study observed migrant
population by overall size rather than strength. Future research will benefit by
assessing the origin of migrant flow and seeing how that impacts drug flow.
Furthermore, this study focused on overall border connectivity. However, future
research will benefit by assessing the quality of borders shared between
countries—taking into account the costal lines of a country and how that may
impact a country’s role as a transit state.
Future research will also benefit from evaluating drug flow by observing
the flow of different drug types, not just cocaine and heroin. This study revealed
how significance of variables varies by drug type, therefore, future research
should look how the influences of certain variables vary by drug type under
observation and why. It is likely that by observing the influence of certain
variables across distinct drug type networks (i.e. hallucinogens,
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methamphetamines, cannabis) researchers will gain a better understanding of
which factors are most important. Expanding focus can potentially lead to the
identification of new factors never even considered in the literature.
It is important to note that while this study looked at variables influenced
by risk and the cost of risk in any given country, it did not actually measure risk.
Future studies will benefit from accounting for the level of risk, as it may help to
better understand attribute variables and their influence. Risk can be accounted
for the rate at which seizures take place in a given country, the number of drug
busts operations, or the rate of conviction rates relating to drug trafficking
charges.
Lastly, future research will also benefit by incorporating a longitudinal
design into their studies. Literature pertaining to drug flow and international drug
trafficking is limited to static models. Data derived from longitudinal studies can
lead to more accurate methods to combat international drug trafficking as it
identifies potential trends and patterns. Furthermore, in observing drug flow
networks annually over a prolonged period enables researchers to attach
changes in a network to external changes occurring in the year of observation,
like policy changes or major drug busts. Overall, observing international drug
trafficking as a whole from a longitudinal perspective poses the ability to identify
temporal order of trends, that otherwise would not have been seen.
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